Satellite photo of the second Soviet Typhoon ballistic missile submarine taken in October 1982 after its launch at the Severodvinsk shipyard. The expected launch of the third Typhoon became a controversial issue within the US intelligence community in late 1983. Satellite photography was the primary method for monitory Soviet submarine construction. (credit: NRO)
Whenever a new Soviet ballistic missile submarine took to sea for the first time, slipping beneath the waves to begin testing its systems and training its crew, there was a good chance that an American attack submarine was lurking in the vicinity, listening in, snooping.
But before the Soviet subs left the vast construction facility at Severodvinsk on the White Sea, the Americans had to find other ways of gathering intelligence on them, and for much of the Cold War their resources were very limited. There were no spies leaving microfilm in dead drops in Moscow, no James Bond in scuba gear crawling out of the freezing water at the dock and snapping photographs before escaping in a hovercraft. For the most part, the primary method the Americans had of gaining intel on new Soviet submarines before they slid below the chilly waters of the Barents Sea were satellites that flew far overhead and took photographs. Continue reading →
Much of the espionage activity by the two spy agencies concentrated on Toronto’s sizable Eastern European expatriate community, especially on immigrants with Ukrainian and Polish roots. In one document dating from 1959, a CIA officer details the profiles of 18 Canadian citizens, most of them Toronto residents, who were suspected by Langley to be working for the KGB. Most of them were believed to be non-official-cover operatives, or NOCs, as they are known in the US Intelligence Community. The term typically refers to high-level principal agents or officers of an intelligence agency, who operate without official connection to the diplomatic authorities of the country that employs them. The declassified document explains that the suspected NOCs had secretly traveled to the USSR after being recruited by the KGB. They were then trained as spies before returning to Canada years later under new identities. Continue reading →
Both the director and deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency at the Pentagon announced on Wednesday that they are to leave their jobs by early fall. The move is thought be the result of mounting pressure by top Washington officials.
United States DIA Director Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn announced to Pentagon staff that he is walking away from that role a year earlier than anticipated.
The news came via a joint statement made by Flynn and the agency’s deputy director, David Shedd, who will also be vacating his post. Continue reading →
The intelligence community that we know no longer exists, as it has been infiltrated long ago and is redirecting its agenda.
Last October we explained how the Benghazi incident highlighted the very sad politicization of the Intelligence reporting of the United States. Not at the functional level, but at various points in the political leadership. Click the link below and read the post in light of this week’s revelations:
Authorities have interviewed at least 13 people since 2005 with ties to Iran’s government who were seen taking pictures of New York City landmarks, a senior New York Police Department official said Wednesday.
U.S. officials long have worried that Iran would use Hezbollah to carry out attacks inside the United States. And Iran was previously accused in a disrupted plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. here last year, a plan interpreted in the U.S. intelligence community as a clear message that Iran is not afraid to carry out an attack inside this country.
In January, James Clapper, the top U.S. intelligence official, said some Iranian officials are probably “more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime.”