- Are we actually being told, then, that the only way to prevent Iran from having nuclear bombs is to let it have them? If not now, in 10-15 years? And with intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the U.S.?
- Even supporters of the deal say that yes, at the ten year mark, Iran will be able to breakout and build a weapon’s worth of nuclear fuel in a year or less — in other words, have nuclear bombs.
- Iran has never come clean with the IAEA — or anyone else — about its nuclear activities. These were discovered not by IAEA inspectors but by the U.S. and allied law enforcement and intelligence services, as well as by dissident groups within Iran. Are we actually assuming that Iran, under this new deal, will now come clean?
- Thus under the July deal the U.S. may not (technically) know if Iran, after a breakout, has a nuclear weapon arsenal until Iran either tests a nuclear warhead or explodes it in an American or Israeli city. Then, of course, the discovery will be “too late” to do anything about, especially if the U.S. is helping Iran with technology assistance designed to prevent attacks on Iran’s nuclear sites.
- Having made so many concessions to a non-nuclear Iran, how tough in the future will we be, faced with a nuclear Iran?
Iran says its nuclear technology program is totally peaceful. In 31 other countries with peaceful nuclear programs, there are 438 nuclear power plants in operation, and in another 16 countries, 67 plants under construction.
Under the terms of the 1969 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, any nation adopting nuclear energy has to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rules. Every one of these nearly 50 countries does. Iran does not.
For over two decades, in fact, Iran has flouted, bamboozled and cheated the IAEA.
What, then, does this pattern of behavior bode for the emerging nuclear deal with Iran?
Iran has never come clean with IAEA — or anyone else — about its nuclear activities — unlike the nearly 50 other nations that have, or are planning to have, nuclear energy.
Are we actually assuming that Iran, under this new deal, will now do so? And if it does not, are we actually assuming that we will now have access to suspicious Iranian activity simply by demanding to inspect such sites?
We are being told that access to Iranian sites where cheating has been, or might be, taking place, will be “managed.”
Iran will, of course, delay IAEA inspections to sanitize the suspected sites. It will also graciously allow China and Russia to help delay further inspections or enforcement action. And of course they can all graciously veto some UN Security Council action. After 24 days of forewarning and countless delay disputes, what will be left to inspect?
No worry, say deal supporters. If Iran breaks the terms of the deal or is uncooperative, sanctions can be “snapped back” in place.
Finally, at the end of the deal, presumably in ten years or so, will Iran have, or not have, the capability to build a nuclear weapon?
Even supporters of the deal say that yes, at the ten year mark, Iran will be able to breakout and build a weapon’s worth of nuclear fuel within a year or less — in other words, have nuclear bombs.
Are we actually being told, then, that the only way to prevent Iran from having nuclear bombs is to let it have them? If not now, in 10-15 years? And with intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the U.S.?
But, the deal’s advocates argue, the IAEA will be able detect such activity, and besides, the nature of the regime will have changed. They do not specify if this change will be for the better or for the worse.
It is important to remember Israel’s long-standing and repeated warnings that Iran was close to one year away from having a nuclear weapons capability. Now, even with a deal, Iran may be as close as three months away — just in time to negotiate still further arrangements until it can run out the clock.
Were the chemical redlines in Syria, for example, not enforced for fear of upsetting Iran?
Did the Obama administration not support Iranian people’s attempted “Green Revolution” in 2009-10 in order not to upset the mullahs?
Did the U.S. refuse to provide weapons to the Kurds in Iraq, with which to confront ISIS, because we did not want to upset the Iranian mullahs, whose agents control much of the Iraqi government?
Did the U.S. apologize for the supposed role of the U.S. in a 1953 Iranian coup — which never in fact occurred, as the Shah had the constitutional power to dismiss the prime minister — again not to upset the mullahs?
Did the U.S. allow India, Japan, Korea and China all to receive sanctions exemptions and import Iranian oil because it did not want to upset the mullahs? It looks suspiciously as if we made all these concessions to grease the diplomatic skids to get a deal. Those represented our “outstretched hand.”
But did these concessions succeed in preventing Iran from continuing to build its nuclear weapons capability? Not for a minute.
Full article: And When We Are Faced with a Nuclear Iran? (The Gatestone Institute)