The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) forbids any of its signatories to have nuclear weapons. Full stop.
Why is the international community not simply enforcing the current NPT?
Iran has already violated so many provisions of the NPT that the UN Security Council and the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) imposed a second protocol requirement on Tehran, to ensure that it abides by the 1970 treaty. The second protocol was also intended to ensure that, in the event of violations, major economic sanctions were imposed Iran by key members of the international community, including and most importantly the United States.
Instead of simply requiring Iran to live up to its obligations under the NPT — signed and ratified by Tehran in 1968 and 1970, respectively — the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany are trying to give Iran a special deal.
Well, the P5+1 have proposed unilaterally to amend the NPT — just for Iran, no other nation.
If Iran is allowed nuclear weapons capability, other nations — including in South America, already infiltrated by Iran — will doubtless follow suit.
The P5+1 would allow Iran, while still a member of the NPT, permanently to enrich uranium and produce plutonium in return for agreeing for some number of years (possibly ten), not to enrich “too much.”
There is, however, no “right to enrich” at all under the NPT or any other law, contrary to some misinformed “conventional wisdom.”
Despite demands by the UN Security Council that Iran provide UN inspectors with access to facilities that members of the IAEA believe are or were used for nuclear weapons work, Iran has refused to comply. Some of these facilities have meanwhile been razed to the ground by Tehran, thereby eliminating what evidence might have been available for inspection.
Supporters of the Administration’s position say: Don’t worry; down the road a decade or so, the government of Iran will have changed.
How likely is that?
North Korea, which joined the NPT in 1985, actually signed a nuclear agreement with the U.S. After the IAEA in 1992 found suspicious discrepancies in its nuclear fuel production, North Korea agreed, in an October 1994 “Agreed Framework,” not to produce nuclear weapons.
In 1998, North Korea launched a long-range missile that had the capability, if further developed, of carrying a 2000-pound warhead to Hawaii and Alaska.
In 2002, North Korea admitted to cheating on the Agreed Framework, and to producing enriched uranium at a secret centrifuge facility.
In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the NPT.
In 2006, North Korea exploded a nuclear weapon.
In 2007, North Korea actually signed a new “agreement” with the United States, to denuclearize the Korean peninsula and end its nuclear weapons program.
North Korea, however, never implemented that agreement.
Full article: Proposed Deal with Iran Not Legal; Iranian Nukes in South America (Gatestone Institute)